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ABSTRACT  
I describe and compare sources of data on citations in economics and the statistics derived from them. 
Constructing data sets of the post-publication citation histories of articles published in the “Top 5” journals 
in the 1970s and the 2000s, I examine distributions and life cycles of citations, compare citation histories 
of articles in different sub-specialties in economics and present evidence on the history and heterogeneity 
of those journals’ impacts and the marginal citation productivity of additional coauthors. I use a new data 
set of the lifetime citation histories of over 1000 economists from 30 universities to rank economics 
departments by various measures and to demonstrate the importance of intra- and inter-departmental 
heterogeneity in productivity. Throughout, the discussion summarizes earlier work, including the impacts 
of citations on salaries and non-monetary rewards, and how citations reflect judgments about research 
quality in economics and the importance of economic ideas.  
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To be occasionally quoted is the only fame I care for.1  [Alexander Smith, 1863, p. 144] 
1. Introduction 
 Why should one care about citations to scholarly articles in economics? Why might looking at 
citations stem from anything more than narcissistic concerns or reflect behavior among an isolated group 
of very competitive individuals? Two answers suggest themselves: 1) On a narrow level, within any group 
of what are essentially independent contractors quality has to be judged. That is true in our business for 
decisions about tenure, salary and hiring researchers for positions above the entry level. Citations may be 
better indicators of the quality of a person’s scholarly work than numbers of publications or the kinds of 
outlets where the research appeared. 2) More broadly, a high enough rate of citation might indicate an 
impressive career in economics—might say something about a person’s scholarly achievements. One’s 
citations may be viewed as a reflection of what one has contributed to society in that part of the job that is 
devoted to research. 
 We might evaluate the quality of scholars’ contributions by considering where they publish their 
work, judging its quality by the quality of its outlet. As I show, however, the tremendous heterogeneity of 
individual contributions published in the same outlet makes attributing journals’ average quality to the 
individual articles they published extremely error-prone. Alternatively, one might rely on one’s own reading 
of scholarly contributions, or the readings by a group of scholars refereeing a person for appointment or 
promotion. This approach may be more sensible, so long as one is willing to discount the tremendous hubris 
involved in claiming that one’s reading of another scholar’s work provides a definitive evaluation of its 
quality or if one can rely on groups of contentious economists to offer similar evaluations.2 Citations, while 
hardly perfect measures of importance (see Kapeller, 2010, and Wang et al., 2016 for details on problems 
with citations) are an arguably objective way of judging the research contributions of academics, one that 
                                                             
1Although we used this as the epigraph in the first paper on citations in which I was involved (Hamermesh et al., 
1982), it is so apropos, since it speaks to the impact of our research on others, that it belongs up front again. 
 
2Tombazos and Dobra (2014) offer citation-based evidence of self-serving biases in judging economics journals, and 
presumably too the individual contributions they contain. 
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is based on what is implicitly a market test, namely whether the scholarly contribution affected the 
subsequent research of other scholars. 
 The first purposes of this essay are to illustrate the kinds of data on citations to economic research 
that are available and to discuss their validity. Having done that, I examine what these data tell us about the 
nature of citations to scholarly work in our field, looking at differences across sub-fields and journals, both 
over time and across individual scholars of different ages/cohorts. While I compare individuals and 
institutions, to reduce the prurient interest in the topic no individuals are mentioned by name, although 
institutions are.  
 How to measure citations—what sources are available for this, and how one uses them—is covered 
in Section 2. Given their availability, what kinds of statistics can be constructed based on these sources? 
Does it matter what source(s) or statistics one uses to evaluate the quality of published research or of 
individual authors’ contributions? 
Given these measurements, in Section 3 I discuss how citations vary across individuals, sub-fields 
and journals. Who is a “superstar” scholar in terms of citations? How do citations vary among individuals 
who differ by experience?   More junior people typically have fewer works to be cited (and less time since 
they were published for them to have been cited), so that I obtain a metric by which to compare the progress 
of, especially, younger scholars. Focusing still on individuals, I consider differences in citations by gender 
and by the institutional affiliation of a scholar. The article proceeds to differences in the measured quality 
of aggregates of economists—the departments of economics in the universities in which they work. In 
addition to providing a series of possibly novel rankings of institutions, it also sheds light on the extent of 
heterogeneity within and across institutions. 
In Section 3 I also consider differences by article, examining whether resurrection occurs for 
previously ignored publications, or whether some articles are mere “flashes in the pan.” Focusing still on 
articles, it considers the marginal productivity, in terms of scholarly impact, of having more authors on a 
paper, thus estimating a short-run production function for quality. This information is useful for assessing 
individual scholars’ contributions, an increasingly important issue in light of the now ubiquitous practice 
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of multiple authorship in economics as compared to practices before 1990 (Hamermesh, 2013). It also 
examines differences in citations by sub-field of economics, concentrating on methodologies rather than on 
the decreasingly meaningful distinctions by area of concentration. It considers how differences in citations 
to articles in different journals have varied over time and examines whether the widespread focus on the 
“Top 5” journals is sensible. Finally, it points out how different citation practices are in economics 
compared to other social sciences. 
Most of the published research on citations in economics has considered them as measures of 
quality that might be useful in explaining various outcomes. Chief among these have been salaries 
(compensation), but several studies have examined other outcomes that are arguably affected by differences 
in the quality of scholarship. Thus in Section 4 I summarize this body of research, research on citations’ 
uses in the history of economic thought, and how they have been used to evaluate editors’ and committees’ 
decisions about publication and awards. The article concludes in Section 5 with a longer apologia for this 
kind of research and for the enhanced use of citations in judging articles, individuals and institutions; and 
it offers suggestions for future directions of research relating various outcomes to citations. 
Readers should keep in mind that citations in academic journals and books, although important 
measures of the productivity of an economist’s research, are only partial indicators of its quality. One’s 
research can, for better or worse, influence broad public attitudes and/or public policy, and it can affect how 
businesses and individuals organize their activities and make decisions.  Moreover, these effects may be 
direct or indirect, as our research filters through others’ research and through the media. While these 
additional and often inchoate impacts are likely to be highly correlated with one’s academic citations, I 
doubt that the correlation is perfect. 
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2. Measuring Citations and Impacts 
2.1 Sources of Information on Citations 
Citation analysis in economics has come a long way since Stigler and Friedland (1975) used hand 
counts through published articles to obtain measures of citations.3 Today the two most commonly used 
online methods of acquiring citation counts to a scholarly work or to a person’s works are the Web of 
Science (WoS), created by the Institute for Scientific Information, and Google Scholar (GS).4  The WoS 
http://apps.webofknowledge.com/ has three sub-categories, for articles in Science, Social Science (SSCI) 
and Arts and Humanities, as well as two sub-categories for conference proceedings, in Science and in Social 
Science and Humanities (CPI-SSH). Except for a very few economists whose work has mainly been 
adopted in more technical fields, obtaining information from the SSCI and the CPI-SSH provides a 
complete or nearly complete measure of a scholar’s impact.5 The majority of the studies summarized here 
use the WoS because they were written before GS became available. 
 Citation counts in the WoS are based on references included in published articles. Each citation is 
included under each author’s name, so that a multi-authored article or book will be listed as a citation for 
each author separately. This was not true when the WoS was only available in print editions (before 2000), 
but citations to all past articles in the online version now reference all authors. The WoS can also be used 
to obtain citations to a particular paper by selecting author, year and volume number on the Cited Reference 
Search screen.  
The usual way of using the WoS works from the URL shown in Figure 1. It is based on the cited 
articles themselves, so that only published articles are included in the citation count. Choosing a search for 
                                                             
3Their graduate students performed these tabulations.  Given the possibilities for error discussed below when using 
the online sources now available, I doubt the desirability of using such labor in analyzing citations today.  
 
4Other, apparently less frequently employed (in economics) databases are Microsoft Academic Search and Elsevier 
Scopus. 
  
5The most extreme case I have encountered is an economist with a meager 407 citations in the WoS whose total count 
rises to 6658 when the two science indexes are included. 
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Author and entering the author’s last name and first initial generates a list of all the author’s (journal) 
publications in descending order of the number of times cited, with citations per year and in total for each, 
along with additional information shown in Figure 1.6 
 The WoS cites people using the initials of their given names.  This method is not a problem for a 
name like Hamermesh, D (except for misspellings of the surname), but it is a difficulty for someone with a 
common surname. This problem makes it hard to collect accurate citation counts for some individuals, 
leading to measurement error of unknown magnitude.  The difficulty can be reduced in a search by 
excluding articles that are obviously classified far outside sub-fields in which an economist might have 
written, but it is inherent in the WoS. 
 Searching for citations using GS has the virtue that it is based on references to an article, working 
paper or book on the internet. It thus has the advantage over the WoS of allowing citations to junior scholars 
to be available earlier in their careers, which is especially important given the long publication lags in 
economics that lead to lags in WoS citations. For those economists who have established a GS profile, it 
provides information like that shown in Figure 2, plus a list of all the referenced publications. If the title, 
as opposed to the outlet, of an article or book does not change between incarnations as working papers, 
articles, etc., all references to the piece are accumulated into one aggregate. 
 The main problem with using GS is that many researchers have not established user profiles, so 
that for them it is extremely time-consuming to obtain a complete citation count (presumably by searching 
separately for each entry on their CVs). That difficulty can be partly mitigated by searching for the person 
in GS, which lists publications arrayed in more or less descending order of the number of citations obtained 
(and even lists the paper’s citation count in the WoS). Instead of counting citations to all the listed 
publications, summing those to the person’s five most-cited papers may be a reasonable substitute and is 
examined in Part B below. Still another serious but much rarer difficulty is that GS will occasionally mis-
                                                             
6A second method that is used less is based on citing articles and thus includes citations to unpublished working 
papers, books and other non-journal publications. In this method an article may be listed several times, for example, 
in its incarnations as working papers disseminated by different organizations and in its published form.  
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attribute a paper by a scholar with an identical or even similar name as the person of interest, a problem 
that, as in the WoS, arises most frequently for scholars with frequently occurring surnames.7  
The problem of identifying names correctly in GS and the similar difficulty in the WoS makes 
counting citations by web-scraping or having a student who is unfamiliar with the works of particular 
scholars problematic. Obtaining accurate citation counts is difficult even if one has a feel for who might 
have written what. Taken together, all of these problems suggest that the most accurate counts by either 
method will be done by hand by someone familiar with the economics literature (perhaps the researcher 
her/himself). 
 Both the WoS and GS provide statistics that seek to aggregate an individual’s citations into one 
number beyond the total count. The most commonly used of these is the h-statistic, proposed by Hirsch 
(2005).8 This statistic is calculated by arraying citations to all of a person’s works from the most- to the 
least-cited, then defining the statistic as the h-most-cited paper that has h citations.  Figure 3 illustrates this 
calculation. Clearly, this statistic does not measure the mean, variance or any other moment. Instead, it 
combines both breadth and depth of impact. 
 As Figure 2 showed, profiles in GS also provide a statistic, i10, indicating the number of a scholar’s 
papers that have been cited ten or more times. This measure provides a fairly low hurdle, so it can be viewed 
chiefly as indicating breadth. Other statistics have been proposed for aggregating and ranking citation 
records. The g-index, offered by Egghe (2006), computes the statistic g such that a scholar’s g most 
frequently cited publications have g2 total citations. Clearly, this index will increase when a much-cited 
publication i ranked gi < g receives an additional citation, while there will be no change in the h-statistic 
when such a publication, ranked hi < h, receives an additional citation. Numerous variations on both of 
                                                             
7This difficulty arises especially often in citation counts for Chinese or Korean scholars, given the relative paucity of 
distinct surnames in those cultures. 
 
8Hirsch proposed this statistic as a way of making achievements in various “hard-scientific” fields commensurate, 
noting that it appeared that Nobel Prizes in these fields were typically awarded to researchers who had attained an h-
statistic of 35 in the WoS. An examination of WoS h-statistics among recent Nobel recipients in economics at the time 
of their award shows huge variations, from below 30 to over 60. 
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these statistics have been offered, including by Ellison (2013) for a sample of economists. No doubt more 
can and will be proposed, as recent theoretical work, Perry and Reny (2016) demonstrates; but the h-statistic 
(in both the WoS and GS) and i10 (in GS for those scholars with profiles) are the only ones readily available 
in all disciplines, and the former is the only one that has been widely used.9 
 Yet another source, although one limited to economics, is RePEc (Research Papers in Economics, 
www.repec.org) which has the virtue similar to GS of including citations to unpublished as well as 
published articles. As with GS profiles, however, not all authors are registered with RePEc, and unlike GS 
it does not seem possible to obtain information on articles of unregistered authors.  
2.2 Comparing Methods and Constructing Data Sets 
Few people would wish to spend time using both the WoS and GS to compare scholars or to 
construct data sets to examine the impacts of citations on outcomes. Given the differences between them, 
how much does it matter which source one uses?  How much does it matter which statistic describing 
citation counts one focuses on given one’s choice of source?  
 To study these and other questions I constructed three new data sets based on the WoS and GS: 1) 
Citations to articles published in the so-called “Top 5” journals—the American Economic Review, 
Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Review of 
Economic Studies, referred to hereafter as J5. These are viewed by many economists as the most prestigious 
in the profession, ones that receive the most attention in hiring and promotion decisions.10  This data base 
covers 1974-75, years arbitrarily chosen to allow a long post-publication period over which citations might 
accrue. It includes all 444 articles that are at least five pages long in print, and it excludes papers (e.g., 
presidential and Nobel addresses) that were obviously not refereed or that were clearly comments. 2) 
                                                             
9Still other calculations and statistics describing individuals’ citations are possible using the software available at 
http://www.harzing.com/pop.htm .  
 
10Pieters and Baumgartner (2002) demonstrated that these were the top five economics journals in terms of generating 
citations from articles outside the journal. This ranking also corresponds with the subjective views of quality in a large 
worldwide sample of economists (Axarloglu and Theoharakis, 2003). 
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Citations to articles in the 2007 and 2008 volumes of J5, with the same exclusions but limited, given the 
increased logorrhea in articles in economics journals, to the 497 publications that are at least ten pages long 
in print. The sample period allows some time for the articles to have had an impact on subsequent 
scholarship while still being nearly contemporary. I obtained citation counts from both the WoS and GS in 
this data set. 3) Citations to all 1043 tenure-stream or tenured faculty members with primary appointments 
in economics departments at the top thirty U.S. economics faculties (ranked based on a history of recent 
publications in Kalaitzidakis et al., 2003).11 For all of these scholars I obtained information on citations to 
their five most-cited papers from GS (C5 hereafter). For the 543 people for whom they were available I 
also obtained entire GS profiles; and for some of them I obtained total WoS citations. Later I examine 
whether C5 appropriately represents a scholar’s total contribution by comparing it to total citations for the 
roughly half-sample for which both measures are available. The first two data sets created here contain all 
citations through December 2014; the third is based on citations cumulated through early May 2015. 
 Clearly the journals that provide the articles used in constructing the first two samples are an elite 
small fraction of all the scholarly outlets available to economists.  In Section 3.5 I provide some evidence 
on how moving further down the journal prestige hierarchy might affect the inferences made here, but the 
main results apply only to research in the most visible outlets in the field. Similarly, results based on the 
sample of economists from a set of 30 leading institutions will not describe the results one might obtain at 
other, typically lower-ranked institutions. In Section 3.4, however, I do make a brief excursion to examining 
comparisons within a broader set of institutions. 
 Examine first the differences that result from using the different methods by comparing WoS to GS 
citations to J5 articles published in 2007-08. Taking all but the eleven most heavily (GS) cited papers among 
the 497 in this sample (to exclude extreme outliers), Figure 4 shows the scatter of the relationship between 
the two measures for the first six or seven post-publication years.  Clearly, the scatter lies quite close to the 
                                                             
11Faculty who were in what was clearly a “teaching track,” as indicated by titles such as “professor of the practice” or 
“senior lecturer,” were excluded from this sample. I obtained faculty members’ names and appointments from each 
department’s website. 
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regression line (and would look even closer, and the fit would be still tighter, if I included the eleven 
outliers).  A good rule of thumb in extrapolating from GS to WoS citations to an article is that the latter will 
be about one-fifth of the former. 
 Since much of the argument for using GS rather than the WoS is the former’s inclusion of citations 
to unpublished papers, I concentrate on differences between the two sources for more junior faculty. Figure 
5 presents a regression of WoS on GS citations based on 102 of the 109 faculty members in the third data 
set who had GS profiles and who received their Ph.D. degrees after 2005 (again excluding extreme positive 
outliers).  As with the comparison of citations counts by articles, here too it appears not to matter very much 
which method one uses (and again, were the 7 heavily-cited individuals included, the fit would be even 
tighter).12 
 RePEc citation counts are available for 73 percent of the 1043 economists in the third sample (and 
are reported in Ozarbayev, 2016). The rank correlation of C5 and the RePEc citation count for these authors 
is 0.94. Even among those scholars whose Ph.D. was awarded after 2005 the rank correlation of the two 
measures is 0.90 (and that of the RePEc count with the WoS citation count is 0.84). Rankings using RePEc 
counts are remarkably similar to those using WoS and GS.13  
 Consider the Spearman rank correlations of various statistics describing citation counts, shown in 
Table 1 for the 52 percent of scholars in the third data set who had GS profiles. Examining pairwise 
correlations among h, i10, C5 and total citations, the rankings are remarkably similar across metrics. Just 
as it does not matter much what source one uses, it also does not matter much what statistic one uses to 
measure citations given the source. Since there is no “right” source or “right” statistic, one should aim for 
breadth and ease of acquisition. With GS profiles only available for barely half the researchers at top 
                                                             
12Restricting the sample still further to those who received their doctoral degree after 2006, or even after 2007 or 2008, 
does not qualitatively alter the slope of the regression or the adjusted R2. 
 
13The likelihood of having a GS profile (RePEc registration) is significantly greater among those who, at the same 
post-Ph.D. experience, had a higher C5 and among men. It rises significantly as experience increases up through 12 
(20) years and falls significantly thereafter. RePEc citations are about 1/8 of GS citations among those who have both 
a GS profile and a RePEc registration. 
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economics departments, these considerations suggest using C5 when comparing individuals or using 
citation data to predict outcomes. C5 is very highly correlated with total citations, suggesting that it is an 
excellent proxy for total citations for individuals without GS profiles. It is also very highly correlated with 
citations to a person’s three most heavily-cited works (rank correlation = 0.998, with rank correlations of 
0.996 within sub-samples of scholars with 30+ years or fewer than 10 years of experience). In the end, for 
papers published in J5, and for individuals located in top economics departments, one’s choice of source 
and statistic is unlikely to affect greatly any conclusions or rankings.14 Finally, the rank correlation of C5 
with WoS citations for scholars with a post-2005 Ph.D. is 0.96, paralleling results in Henrekson and 
Waldenström (2011) in a small sample of Swedish full professors. 
 One might worry that citations are phony, in the sense that citation counts are swollen by negative 
citations (criticizing a work) or by references by members of one’s scholarly network (students, colleagues, 
etc.). Undoubtedly we do cite our colleagues, coauthors and mentors, especially when we are new to the 
field (Clements and Wang, 2003). Cole and Cole (1973), however, demonstrate for the physical sciences 
that the correlation between all of one’s citations and the total excluding what are viewed as negative 
citations is very high. This result is not surprising: Scholars usually do not waste time attacking research 
that has not already garnered attention from other scholars. Similarly, and based on the RePEc data 
constructed by Ozarbayev (2016), excluding citations by one’s coauthors and members of a slightly more 
broadly defined network hardly alters the rankings of citations to the scholars in the third sample used here.  
 This essay deals with citations in economics; but, as noted above, the justification for using citations 
is that they are a market-based measure of the quality of research. They are by far the most widely examined 
measure; but downloads of articles also measure other scholars’ interest in one’s work. To examine the 
relationship between downloads and citations, I obtained the total number of downloads for the sub-sample 
of scholars in Top 30 departments who were registered on RePEc. Unlike in GS, books will not be 
                                                             
14With the sample limited to 30 very high-quality departments I cannot be sure that the same results would hold if I 
had cast the quality net more widely. That the rank correlation of 0.982 between total and C5 citations shown for this 
sample in Table 1 rises to 0.985 in the lower-quality half-sample in this group does, however, suggest that the result 
holds fairly generally. 
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downloadable and cannot be included in these statistics. Nonetheless, for those scholars whose Ph.D. was 
obtained after 2005 the rank correlation between C5 and the number of downloads was 0.78; and for those 
who received their Ph.D. in 1980 or earlier the rank correlation was 0.83. Clearly, downloads provide very 
similar information on research quality to citations. 
3. Differences in Citations across Individuals, Articles, Sub-Fields, Institutions and 
Journals  
 
In this Section I consider a wide range of issues focusing solely on the bibliometrics of citations—
on their variation across a wide range of indicators. A central fact runs through all these comparisons: The 
distributions of citation measures are highly right-skewed. For that reason, throughout this Section I present 
data describing the shapes of the distributions of citations, not merely measures of central tendency, 
particularly means, which have been the main focus in the literature.  
3.1 Differences among Individuals 
Within the sample of 1043 economists from elite institutions there are tremendous differences in 
the extent to which their works have been cited and have thus presumably influenced the work of other 
scholars. As Table 2 shows, the mean citations to their five most-cited papers is about 3000; but the median 
is less than 1100.  The mean h-statistic (in the positively-selected subsample that has established GS 
profiles) is 25, while the median is 17, implying less skewness in this summary measure than in the C5 
measure or, as the table shows, in the counts of total citations in this sub-sample. 
While the term “superstar” is widely and loosely applied, one might ask what constitutes a “super-
economist?” Consider the ten scholars whose citations place them in the top 1 percent of the distributions 
shown in Table 2, Column (1). Their average C5=38,818, arguably making them true super-economists. 
Clearly, these are the most influential people in this profession in the United States, at least as measured by 
the impact of their research on that of other scholars. Moreover, given the pre-eminence of U.S. universities 
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in economics, and the limitation of the sample to what are arguably the top 30 U.S. economics departments, 
these scholars stand on an even higher pinnacle in the profession worldwide.15 
The citation measures in this sample reflect cumulative citations over a scholar’s publishing 
lifetime.  Other things equal, this generates a positive citations-age profile, so that the raw data described 
in Table 2 tend to place more senior scholars higher in the distributions of the various measures. This 
tendency may be offset in the GS measures by their inclusion of references to discussion/working papers, 
series of which and their availability have proliferated with the creation and expansion of the internet. The 
availability of online indexes may also have generated a positive trend in citations per article (McCabe and 
Snyder, 2015). It is also more than offset in the WoS by the growth in the numbers of sources included in 
that data set.16 
I examine the life cycle of citations (cross-section data, and thus not indicative of the life cycle of 
citations of a particular cohort) by including for each individual in the sample his/her years of post-Ph.D. 
experience (2015 – Ph.D. year), a. This information might be useful for comparing younger scholars who 
are being considered for re-appointment or for tenure, and perhaps even for considering the achievements 
of more senior scholars who might be appointed to new positions. Table 3 presents these citation-experience 
profiles, aggregating more experienced individuals into broader categories. Perhaps most noteworthy in 
these data is that the skewness demonstrated above in the aggregate persists as experience increases and, 
indeed, remains roughly constant (comparing the ratios of means to medians).  
                                                             
15For examples, the most-cited academic economist in the United Kingdom would be in the 99th percentile of scholars, 
as ranked by C5, if in the U.S. sample;  the most-cited in the French-speaking world would barely be at the 99th 
percentile; the most cited economist in the German-speaking part of Europe would “only” be in the 98th percentile; 
the most-cited economists based in Canada or Israel would only be at the 97th percentile in this ranking; and the most-
cited economist in Australia would be at the 96th percentile. 
 
16Without longitudinal data one cannot distinguish among trends in citations, individuals’ life-cycles of citations, and 
differences in citations across cohorts (as in Borjas, 1985, describing immigrants’ earnings). Using an unbalanced 
panel of WoS data describing citations from 1991-2013 to 111 high-achieving labor economists whose Ph.D. degrees 
were received between 1955 and 2002 (clearly not a random sample), one finds that at the same age (or cohort—we 
cannot distinguish between them) there was a near doubling of the number of WoS citations over the 22 years in the 
sample. Alternatively, examining the history of citations to articles published in the American Economic Review, 
Margo (2011) finds roughly a quintupling of early post-publication citations to them in six elite economics journals 
(J5 plus Review of Economics and Statistics) between 1960 and 2000. 
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These are not longitudinal data, and following individuals’ citations through their careers is 
extremely cumbersome. Some inkling about their time paths is easily obtained for those scholars with GS 
profiles. Estimating the regression of GS citations from 2010 through May 2015 on lifetime GS citations 
among scholars with at least 31 years of experience yields a coefficient of 0.39, with an adjusted R2 of 
0.98.17 A least-absolute deviations (LAD) regression yields the identical slope, although the pseudo-R2 is 
“only” 0.85. Despite the skewness in citations in all the samples used, parameter estimates generally differ 
very little between least-squares (OLS) and LAD regressions, a result that persists in all the relationships 
estimated in this study. 
One could use this information mutatis mutandis to compare scholars within and across cohorts. 
Let Ci and Cj be the citation counts of scholars i and j, and let ai > aj be their (Ph.D.) ages.  Then if F(a) is 
the cross-section citations-age profile, under the assumption that F is independent of the (constant) secular 
annual rate of growth of citations per article, θ, the appropriate comparison of i’s and j’s scholarly impact 
is: 
(1) Ci -  F(ai) – θ [ai-aj] to Cj -  F(aj) .
 18 
One might be interested in extending this calculation, if one could determine average differences in citation 
practices across sub-fields (see below), to compare scholars in different sub-fields in economics. 
The data set also allows one to examine whether there are gender differences in the extent to which 
scholars are cited, a claim that was made and disputed in research from the 1980s (Ferber, 1988; Laband, 
1987). Finding a differential rate of citation to male and female authors would tell us nothing about the 
presence of discrimination (just as demonstrating the existence of a wage differential by gender cannot 
inform us whether it arises from discrimination or differences in productivity), unless one assumes that 
                                                             
17Lifetime total GS citations in this sample of 108 very senior scholars range from 593 to 214,046.  Even with the 
possible selection generated by less successful researchers leaving university jobs at earlier ages, the data still cover a 
very broad range of scholarly recognition. 
 
18I am indebted to Jeffrey Frankel for suggesting this exercise. If the two underlying assumptions are violated, a more 
complex formula can be constructed fairly easily with some additional work. 
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published papers are inherently of equal quality across gender. I thus present an outcome, saying nothing 
about causation. 
 To examine these issues I expand LAD regressions that relate C5 to the vector of indicators of 
experience by adding an indicator of gender (female). I estimate these equations separately for half sub-
samples arrayed by post-Ph.D. experience (with the median experience being 17 years). In the older half-
sample only 9 percent of the faculty are female, while in the younger half 19 percent are. The estimates, 
shown in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, suggest that older female faculty have indeed been cited less than 
their male contemporaries, but the difference is small and statistically insignificant; and the difference is 
essentially zero among younger faculty. When we add the rank of the economist’s department (1 being the 
department whose median-cited faculty member has the most citations), to examine whether female 
economists’ citation totals differ from those of men in equal average-quality departments, the results, shown 
in Columns (2) and (4) suggest little change in the conclusions. There may have been gender discrimination 
in citation practices in economics in the past, but this evidence suggests that it was small, and it is not 
apparent in the treatment of younger economists. 
 Several studies (e.g., Eiran and Yariv, 2006; Huang, 2015) have argued that the position of one’s 
name in the alphabet affects success in the economics profession, such as the attainment of a tenured 
position, perhaps due to the practice of listing coauthors’ names alphabetically (Engers et al., 1999). This 
may have been true before the growth of the internet, when hard-copy volumes of the WoS listed only first 
authors, but it seems less likely to be true now that all authors are included in citation counts. To examine 
whether there are alphabetical effects on citations, the names of the authors in the sample were alphabetized 
and a variable ranging from 1 to 1043 was added to the LAD estimating equation. Moving from the first to 
the median (in the alphabet) author reduces C5 citations in the more senior half-sample by 1.8 percent (t = 
-0.55), and among their younger colleagues it reduces citations by 0.7 percent (t = -0.22). Those whose 
surnames are late in the alphabet are cited less frequently than their “A” colleagues, but the differences are 
slight, statistically unimportant and, as expected, smaller in percentage terms among more junior scholars. 
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  Another difference that may be viewed as a kind of discrimination might be the existence of 
bandwagon effects in citations: One paper among several similar ones is cited shortly after it appears, and 
subsequent papers disproportionately cite it rather than equally important papers that appeared at the same 
time—or even earlier. Partly this sort of herding may reflect what Merton (1968) identified as “the Matthew 
Effect”—the attribution of credit to the better-known scholar in a pair or even in a group of scholars who 
have contemporaneously produced very similar work.19 No doubt this kind of behavior occurs and is 
unfortunate (for lesser-known people), but its extent is completely unclear. 
One might worry that some citations are self-citations and do not reflect an article’s true scholarly 
productivity. One study of articles in the AER and the Economic Journal found WoS self-citation rates, 
which I denote as the “Ego Index,” approaching ten percent (Hudson, 2007). The extent of self-citation is 
impossible to obtain from GS, but WoS citations are summarized in total and without self-citations. 
Rankings among individuals or articles are hardly altered when self-citations are excluded. Selecting the 
junior economists (Ph.D. year after 2005) in the sample of 1043 faculty, the rank correlation of total 
citations and citations by others is 0.99, with an Ego Index having a mean of 0.07 (median of 0.05, range 0 
to 1). Randomly selecting 100 of the senior (31+ years of experience), the rank correlation of total citations 
and citations by others is also 0.99, with an Ego Index having mean and median of 0.03 (range of 0 to 0.16). 
Moreover, additional self-citations do not generate more citations by other scholars (Medoff, 2006).20 
3.2 Differences among Articles 
Just as the distribution of citations across a group of scholars is highly right-skewed, so too is the 
distribution of citations across articles, including those in J5. In the sample of 444 articles published in 
these journals in 1974 and 1975, total SSCI citations from 1974 through 2014 ranged from 0 to 2466, with 
                                                             
19I was the “victim” of the Matthew Effect when a visiting lecturer referred in his paper and presentation to “Gary 
Becker’s important work on suicide.” I was not in the audience, but one of my colleagues pointed out that it was my 
work, and that Becker had never written on the topic. 
 
20Frances Hamermesh noted that this article may be aimed at adding to my citation count (even though its Ego Index 
is “only” 0.07). One study in the 2007-8 sample of articles cited 72 works, of which 20 were by the sole author of the 
paper (Ego Index of 0.28). A four-authored article in that sample had a collective Ego Index (an oxymoron) of 0.40. 
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a mean (median) of 75 (22); and even the paper at the 95th percentile received “only” 360 citations over its 
forty post-publication years. Only five percent of these elite articles were uncited (compared to 26 percent 
of articles in a much broader set of journals examined by Laband and Tollison, 2003). The extent of 
skewness is illustrated by the distribution graphed in Figure 6a, in which, to make citations across journals 
commensurate, I have standardized articles by page size (using AER2008 pages) and divided the citations 
of each article by its AER2008-equivalent pages.21 As the figure shows, most papers, even in these 
prestigious outlets, are very rarely if ever cited, with relatively few articles accounting for the attention that 
scholars concentrate on these journals. 
Of course, we cannot be sure that such skewness will prevail over the future lifetimes of recently 
published articles; but taking the 2007-08 sample, the distribution of citations (through 2014) per AER2008-
equivalent page, shown in Figure 6b, looks very much like that in Figure 6a. The statistics describing the 
distribution are also similar, with total SSCI citations ranging from 0 to 478 and a mean (median) of 50 
(36); and even the paper at the 95th percentile received “only” 142 citations in its first seven post-publication 
years. Only one of these articles was uncited, perhaps reflecting the growth of the literature, perhaps 
indicating an increase in the focus on J5 by authors publishing elsewhere. 
The distribution of citations to more recent articles exhibits less skewness than that to the older 
articles over their longer post-publication lifetimes. Has there been a secular broadening of interest in papers 
published in these journals, or do articles that are little-cited early post-publication die off more quickly 
than those that have become “superstar articles” in the eyes of future scholars? Taking the first ten years of 
post-publication WoS citations to articles in the 1974-75 sample, the mean (median) citations are 22 (11), 
with a range of 0 to 333, and “only” 82 citations at the 95th percentile. Like the distribution of citations to 
2007-08 articles, the distribution of initial (first-decade) citations to 1974-75 articles exhibits less skewness 
than the distribution of citations over a much longer period. “Star” articles become superstar articles, while 
“asteroid” articles become dust. 
                                                             
21In this sample each additional AER2008-equivalent page generated an extra 7 citations over the 40 or 41 years after 
the article’s publication. 
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This evidence suggests that there generally are few “flashes in the pan”—papers that attract much 
attention initially and are then ignored—and few “resurrections”—papers that are ignored and come to life 
much later—among scholarly articles in economics. Perhaps, however, there are at least a few exceptions—
perhaps there is hope for articles that were once ignored, and perhaps some that receive substantial early 
attention are soon ignored. Table 5 compares citations in the post-publication years 21-40 of the 1974-75 
articles to their ranks in citation counts in their first ten post-publication years. None of the twenty percent 
of initially least-cited papers is among the top twenty percent in citations in the most recent twenty years; 
and most remain ignored. Obversely, while a few of the papers that are in the top fifth of citations in the 
first ten post-publication years are eventually ignored, most remain well-cited even in post-publication “old 
age.” There are very few flashes in the pan or resurrections, even among articles published in the most 
visible outlets. 
The mean citation in this sample (among the 423 articles that received at least one citation) occurred 
14 years after the article’s publication. Consistent with the evidence above, however, the mean age of 
citations to the 40 percent of articles with the fewest (nonzero) citations was 11 years, while that to the 17 
percent with the most citations (at least 100) was 20 years.  The initially most-cited papers “last longer” 
than others.22 One’s publications do not last as long, however, if one is no longer active: Aizenman and 
Kletzer (2011) provide stark evidence of this, showing that citations to articles by very productive 
economists who died young drop below those to contemporaneous articles written by otherwise identical 
contemporaries who survived them. And explicit citations to the work even of historical superstars 
eventually diminish (Anderson et al., 1989); their work is eventually either ignored or becomes part of the 
background that today’s scholars take for granted. 
How long a citation history might be needed to predict the long-run impact of a scholarly economics 
article? In a negative binomial regression of citations to articles in the 1974-75 sample, citations in post-
                                                             
22This evidence is related to that of Quandt (1976), who examined the mean age of references in articles in J5 (except 
the Review of Economic Studies) plus the Economic Journal, Economica, the Review of Economics and Statistics and 
the Southern Economic Journal. 
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publication years 11 through 40 are significantly related to citations in each of the first and second five 
post-publication years. The relationship is, however, much stronger for the citations in the second five 
years. This suggests that using the first few years of scholarly interest in an article is not sufficient to gauge 
its long-term impact, and that a regrettably longer period is required. Nonetheless, faute de plus even using 
five years of citations provides some useful information about long-term impacts. 
With the entire distribution of the number of authors listed on an article in economics moving 
steadily rightward, an important issue in evaluating people’s records for appointment or promotion is how 
to account for multiple authorship. Even ignoring the possibility that one’s coauthors are surely more likely 
to cite their own works, which will increase one’s citation count the more coauthors are listed on an article, 
does having more authors on a paper add to its scholarly impact? What should be the divisor of citations 
when evaluating an article, with extremes being 1 and N, the number of authors?  
In the very long run the answer to this question should be: Divide by N, since eventually the full 
impact of an article has become known and, absent the kinds of specific ex ante attributions of credit that 
appear in many published articles in the hard sciences, credit should be divided equally.  This rule is of 
little practical help, since the evaluation of research proceeds in the very short-run. One can at least get a 
hint of what the long-run production function might look like, however, by examining citations in various 
intermediate runs. Consider an article-based production function of quality as: 
(2) Qit = Q(Nit, Tt), 
where i is an article, Q can be proxied by citations, N is the number of authors, and T is the technology of 
producing research of a given quality at time t.23 This relationship has been examined in several studies 
using specific samples, but not comparing publications in two widely-separated time periods, and not 
concentrating on J5 publications. We could estimate regressions describing QN and even infer something 
about QNT, thus whether the expansion path of Q in N is homothetic in changes in technology. The size of 
                                                             
23Flores-Szwagrzak and Treibich (2016) propose a person-based adjustment, combining the citation counts to a 
scholar’s sole- and co-authored papers. 
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QN and the sign of QNT can, however, be inferred simply from an examination of the means and centile 
points of the distributions of WoS citations as functions of the number of authors listed on the paper. 
 Table 6 presents these statistics.  There is no significant difference at any point of the distribution 
of lifetime citations between the one-fourth of papers that were multi-authored in the early period and those 
to single-authored papers. In the more recent period, however, multi-authored papers did receive more 
citations in their first seven post-publication years, a difference that is visible across the distributions of 
citations.  But going from one to four or more authors roughly only doubles the number of citations at each 
point of the distribution—it does not quadruple it. Moreover, since additional authors lengthen papers in 
these samples, if we use citations per page the differences by number of authors are even smaller.24  Taken 
together, the results suggest that today QN >0 and QNN <0, and indicate that QNT>0. These findings are 
consistent with those of Hollis (2001), who measured production by the impact factors of the journals where 
the articles appear, and Medoff (2003), who used citations to individual articles published in 1990. Having 
more coauthors on one’s papers may induce additional citations to one’s other works, partly since coauthors 
become familiar with papers that they may feel obligated to cite (Bosquet and Combes, 2013), but the effect 
of additional authors on a paper’s citations is clearly not proportional to the number of authors. 
Given the impossibility of evaluating the long-term impact of an article and dividing by the number 
of authors N, a good rule of thumb suggested by the results in the bottom part of Table 6 is that job 
candidates’ citations—their influence on other scholars—might well be divided by N/2 for N>1. At the very 
least, one should discount citations to multi-authored articles by some factor.25 
  
                                                             
24The results tabulated in the upper part of Table 6 do not change qualitatively if we restrict citations to the first seven 
post-publication years, thus making them comparable to those in the later sample. They also do not change very much 
if we use GS rather than WoS citations to describe the production function in the later sample. 
 
25There is also some evidence that having additional authors does not help get papers into more prestigious journals. 
The mean number of authors of articles in the later J5 sample was 2.01. The mean number of authors of articles 
published in 2007-08 in a pair of general-interest journals that might be viewed as the next rung down the journal 
prestige hierarchy, the Economic Journal and the Review of Economics and Statistics, was 1.97, not significantly less. 
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3.3 Differences among Sub-Fields 
For over 50 years the JEL and its predecessor, the Index of Economic Abstracts, have maintained a 
(changing) coding system for classifying journal articles. At a time when macroeconomic research is 
increasingly micro-based, and when applied work in such formerly diverse fields as economic development, 
labor economics, public finance, and perhaps others seems increasingly characterized by similar 
approaches, it may make sense for purposes of analysis to use a methodology- rather than a subject-based 
classification of published research. This approach currently requires hands-on examination of each paper 
rather than an easy reliance on author-provided codes, but it may be more appropriate given the changes 
that have occurred in the field over time.  (See Cherrier, 2015, and Kosnik, 2016, for discussions of various 
difficulties with the JEL coding system.)  
I thus classify the articles in the 2007-08 data set into the following six categories: Theory; theory 
with simulation (including the substantial part of recent macroeconomic research that uses calibration 
methods); empirical with borrowed data; empirical with own data; experimental; and econometric theory.26 
Because no experimental studies are included in the 1974-75 data set, and very little empirical research was 
based on data sets that the author(s) had created, for the earlier sample I divide publications into those in 
theory (including theory articles that also involved simulations), empirical economics and econometric 
theory. 
 Statistics in the upper two panels of Table 7 describing the two data sets based on J5 articles show 
that in their first seven post-publication years empirical and experimental studies generated more citations 
than did articles in economic theory or econometric theory in these journals. (This conclusion is similar to 
that of Anauati et al., 2016, who used GS citations and a somewhat similar classification of articles.) This 
is true for the average paper, true at the medians and even true at the 90th percentile. The only caveat to the 
                                                             
26Excluding econometric theory, because it did not include Econometrica, the same classification was used by 
Hamermesh (2013). 
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conclusion that empirical research generates more subsequent attention than theoretical work is at the upper 
extreme of citations: The most heavily-cited study in the earlier sample was in economic theory.27 
 One might argue that this comparison ignores the long-lasting effect of theoretical work (a point 
similar to that made by Chiappori and Levitt, 2003), and that a fair examination of the attention paid to 
articles based on different methodologies would cover a longer period of time. To examine this hypothesis 
for the earlier data set, thus allowing forty years of post-publication citations to accumulate, modifies the 
conclusion based on the first seven post-publication years of citations only slightly. At the median and 90th 
percentiles of the distributions, empirical articles dominate articles in the other categories; but because four 
theory articles are the most cited in this sample, there is no significant difference at the mean between 
lifetime citations to articles in economic theory and those in empirical economics. Since in the later sample 
the upper tail of the distribution of citations to empirical studies was denser than that to theoretical studies, 
there may be some doubt whether the long-run impact of theory articles, as measured by citations, will be 
as relatively large among recently published articles as it was in the past.28 
 Yet another possibility is that there are differences across sub-fields in the amount of citing, which, 
if citations are disproportionately to other research in the same sub-field, could generate the results shown 
in Table 7. To examine this possibility I counted the number of items cited (excluding data sources) in the 
sample of articles from 2007-08. Across the six sub-fields listed in the table, the median numbers of cited 
items per article were: Theory, 32; theory with simulation, 37; borrowed-data empirical, 39; own-data 
empirical, 35; experimental, 33, and econometric theory, 38. These differences seem fairly small; and the 
extent to which citations are concentrated within sub-fields is, however, unclear, as many of the theory 
                                                             
27OLS and LAD estimates that include indicators for the journal where the article was published yield inferences very 
much like those reflected in the statistics in this table. 
  
28Citations to even the most heavily-cited article in econometric theory in the later sample were surpassed by those to 
seven empirical articles, suggesting that the relative long-run impact of recent empirical studies and those in 
econometric theory will not differ from their short-run impact. 
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papers motivate themselves by references to empirical findings, and many of the empirical studies cite 
theoretical work.29  
 Even though the quantities of citations do not appear to differ greatly across sub-fields, ideally in 
comparing individuals one would like to account for differences in citation practices across the sub-fields 
in which they work. The difficulty, of course, is that many economists work in several sub-fields, whether 
classified by major JEL category or by the six-fold classification used here. Perhaps the best conclusion is 
that this consideration should be an important caveat in any comparisons of individual scholars’ 
productivity.  
A related problem is that publication rates by sub-field, and thus to some extent the possibility of 
generating citations, may differ across sub-fields. Some attempts have been made to account for this 
possibility, normalizing citations by sub-field (as van Leeuwen and Calero Medina, 2012, and Bornmann 
and Wohlrabe, 2016, have done using JEL codes). Ignoring the issue of the JEL codes’ appropriateness as 
sensible classifications of sub-fields, one might argue that normalization by sub-field may not make much 
sense. If a sub-field is tiny and of little interest to most economists, having a relatively highly-cited article 
within the sub-field is arguably less important than a relatively less well-cited article in a sub-field of greater 
interest to most scholars.  
3.4 Differences Among Institutions  
Ranking economics departments by quality is a long-standing enterprise. See, e.g., Cartter (1966), 
Roose and Anderson (1970) and National Research Council (1995), based on surveys of impressions (with 
Thursby, 2000, showing that ratings only partly reflect publication and citation counts of the rated 
departments); Gerrity and McKenzie (1978), perhaps the first article to use citations in economics, and 
Davis and Papanek (1984) more broadly, based on average citations; Graves et al. (1982) and many 
                                                             
29Still another possibility is that, despite the general evidence of the similarity of patterns of WoS and GS citations 
shown in Figures 4 and 5, the relationships between the two measures differ across sub-fields. Holding constant 
indicators of the journals where the articles in the 2007-08 sample appeared, the only significant differences across 
sub-fields are that both experimental work and econometric theory receive more relatively more WoS than GS 
citations compared to those received by articles in the other four sub-fields. 
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followers, based on pages published in selected sets of journals; Tschirhart (1989) and Dusansky and 
Vernon (1998), based upon measures of the average quality of the journals in which faculty members 
published; Amir and Knauff (2008), using a measure of the quality of placements of Ph.D. students; Mixon 
and Upadhyaya (2012), based on the awards faculty received; and Ellison (2013), based on average h-
statistics and other transformations of citation counts. I produce yet another such ranking, using the data on 
the 1043 scholars in the 30 economics departments. The novelty here is several-fold: 1) I examine 
differences in rankings of institutions based on comparisons at various quantiles of the distributions of their 
faculties’ citations (rather than at the means), which is important given the tremendous skewness of citation 
counts demonstrated in Table 3; 2) I measure the extent to which the quality of faculties, as indicated by 
citations, overlaps across departments; and 3) I adjust for inter-departmental differences in the distributions 
of seniority.  
Authors of any study that compares departments by citation counts must decide on several issues: 
1) Use the count of citations to articles/books ever published by the current staff, or use citation counts 
based on authors’ affiliations at the times of publication? The former approach advantages institutions that 
recruit much of their staff to senior positions, the latter helps schools that might be viewed as “training 
grounds.” 2) Use lifetime or recent citations? 3) Use order statistics or averages of citations? 4) Use 
individual-based statistics or departmental totals (thus advantaging larger faculties)? There is no correct 
answer to these questions, as they depend on one’s view of what determines the scholarly reputation of an 
institution. In what follows I choose the first answer to each question. I do provide enough information, 
however, that one can construct rankings based on the alternatives to the third and fourth choices. 
I first calculate rd50, the rank of the department by the citations of the median-cited faculty member, 
C550.  I then also calculate rd50 - x
*, the highest-ranked department in which, if they were transferred there, 
the top quartile of faculty members (ranked by C5i) in Department d would be above the median faculty 
member’s citation count in that department.  
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 The results of these calculations are presented in Table 8.30 The first column lists the number of 
faculty members included in each department, while the second shows the department’s ranking, rd50 and 
the third presents C550.
 31 The median citations in the top-ranked department are an extreme outlier from 
the rest of the sample; beyond that, the differences in C550 among departments are much smaller over the 
broad range from the 5th through the 14th-ranked department.  
The fourth column shows rankings in the study from which this sample of 30 departments was 
taken (Kalaitzidakis et al. (KMS), 2003). Even though rd50 is based on lifetime citations to articles ever 
published by the median-cited person in an economics department in 2014-15, while KMS used journals’ 
impact factors and total impact-factor weighted publications of articles published in 1995-99, the 
correlation between these rankings that differ greatly in methodology and timing is 0.70.32 
The apparent inter-institutional diversity in quality, however, does not reflect the tremendous intra-
institutional diversity that underlies these statistics. The calculations of x* in the fifth column show that the 
scholars in the top quartiles of schools in all but three of the departments ranked 11 through 20 are more 
heavily-cited than the median scholar in at least the tenth-ranked department; and those in the top quartile 
of economists in schools ranked 6 through 10 are more heavily-cited than the median scholar in the school 
ranked second. The top people in lower-ranked institutions (in this elite group) would, if the correlation of 
departmental and individual rankings were one, be placed far higher than their current employment 
indicates. The overlap is consistent with evidence from Kim et al. (2009) of a decline in the effect of one’s 
                                                             
30The rankings in KMS are necessarily higher in larger departments; and, as they include all publishers from an 
institution, not only those in an economics department, an institution ranked more highly if it contained more people 
outside an economics department who published in economics journals. 
 
31The rank correlation between the medians measure shown in the Table and the mean citations across departments is 
0.87. Listing the ranks of schools by mean citations in the same order as in the Table yields: 1, 3, 4, 6, 2, 5, 8, 7, 19, 
9, 11, 21, 16, 12, 10, 18, 15, 17, 20, 26, 22, 28, 14, 25, 13, 24, 27, 29, 23, 30. 
 
32With one exception, the replacement of Yale by NYU, the top seven schools in this ranking are the same seven 
viewed as distinguished in the Cartter (1966) ranking, which was based on a survey fielded in 1964. Cartter’s 
compendium sought to be a nationally representative set of opinions, following earlier studies that were viewed as 
parochial (Hughes, 1925, and Keniston, 1959). 
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academic affiliation—the quality of one’s colleagues—on one’s scholarly productivity, although obviously 
the Table does not provide longitudinal evidence. 
 The most productive (top quartile) economists in a large number of institutions would raise the 
median quality of the faculties in departments ranked far above theirs. This overlap suggests that newly-
minted Ph.D.s might be a bit less concerned about the average quality of departments in which they are 
seeking or being offered employment. The same comment applies to university graduates applying to Ph.D. 
programs: There are large numbers of high-quality potential mentors at many institutions (and there is 
convincing evidence of the greater relative importance of the scholarly achievements of a Ph.D. student’s 
mentor than of the average faculty member at the student’s institution, Hilmer and Hilmer, 2009). 
 One might argue that faculties should be judged by the achievements of their stars, not by those of 
their median faculty members. While the Table demonstrates the extent of overlaps in quality, alternative 
rankings of departments based on single statistics measuring faculty quality in the upper tail do not hugely 
change one’s perception of distinctions among departments. The sixth column in Table 8 ranks departments 
by the citations of the faculty member at the 90th percentile of this measure within departments. Even using 
this extreme ranking 7 of the top 10 departments ranked by median quality remain in the top 10, and 16 of 
the top 20 ranked by median quality remain in the top 20.   The correlation of the two rankings is 0.68 
(rising to 0.78 if the Los Angeles–area outliers, two of the smallest departments in the sample, are deleted). 
As suggested by Table 3, those institutions with more junior faculty will exhibit lower average and 
median citations. To account for such differences I generate predicted median citations for each individual 
i, C5*i, by estimating a LAD regression describing each scholar’s citations C5i as a function of the large 
vector of indicators of post-Ph.D. experience, a, shown in Table 3. I then use these predictions to adjust the 
citations of each faculty member in department d for experience by taking the residual C5i – C5
*
i, and then 
rank departments by the median of this residual to obtain r*d50. The results of this re-ranking are presented 
in the final column in Table 8. The correlation of this measure, r*d50, with rd50 is 0.78. While the adjustment 
matters, except for a few institutions (those with unusually junior or senior faculties), it does not change 
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the rankings very much (with this re-ranking particularly advantaging Cornell and UT-Austin, and 
disadvantaging Minnesota). 
 The sample was constructed using faculty members located in each university’s economics 
department, so that the rankings necessarily ignore the facts that some institutions have large and often 
highly productive groups of economists located in other units on campus (e.g., business, public policy, 
education or law schools) and that the importance of this phenomenon differs across institutions. Since it is 
impossible to identify all units where economists might be located in each of these institutions, I leave it to 
readers to make their own mental adjustments of these rankings to account for these inter-institutional 
differences. 
 This discussion has concentrated on the top-ranked American economics faculties, perhaps 
appropriately given the concentration of articles in leading journals written by U.S.-based scholars 
(Hodgson and Rothman, 1999), a dominance that citation analysis shows is not diminishing (Drèze and 
Estevan, 2007). Given the increasing flows of economists to and mostly from Europe (and to a much lesser 
extent, to and mostly from Asia and Australia), however, one might wonder where the top-ranked schools 
in other English-speaking countries would fit into the rankings presented in Table 8. To characterize this 
issue simply, I examined median C5 citations of faculty members in the institution in the United Kingdom 
that received the highest ranking in the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF), University College 
London (UCL), computing the same measures for it that underlay the rankings in Table 8. By this measure 
UCL would have ranked twenty-first in Table 8; and, as with the faculties in the U.S., its faculty members 
are very diverse, so that x*=14. A similar exercise for what RePEc rated in 2016 as the leading economics 
faculty in Canada, that of the University of British Columbia, would have it ranked 26th in Table 8, with 
x*=16. 
 These and the many other institutional rankings concentrate on an elite group of research-oriented 
institutions. On average members of these faculties are more heavily cited than economists at lower-ranked 
research institutions; but just as within this set of 30 schools, there is substantial overlap of them with 
faculties at lower-ranked schools. Taking a randomly chosen set of 5 economics faculties in departments 
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ranked between 31 and 55 in the U.S. in KMS, 32 percent of scholars in those departments were more 
heavily cited (C5) than the median scholar in the elite sample, Taking another randomly chosen set of 5 
faculties in departments ranked between 56 and 90 in the U.S. in KMS, 13 percent of scholars were more 
heavily cited (C5) than the median scholar in the elite sample. These comparisons illustrate that the extent 
of overlap diminishes but still remains substantial as one moves further beyond the most elite institutions, 
so that even within a broad range the average quality of an institution’s faculty is not terribly informative 
about individuals’ achievements. 
 Faculty at liberal arts colleges are also expected to do research. In a study including 51 schools and 
439 faculty members, Bodenhorn (2003) showed sharp differences among institutions, with a citation-based 
count (most recent ten years of citations in the WoS) ranking colleges generally according with perceptions 
of their quality. While the statistics are difficult to compare, my best estimate is that eight full professors in 
these colleges received more citations than the median in Hamermesh’s (1989) sample of full professors in 
six large public research universities’ economics departments. 
3.5 Differences among Journals 
 The history of citations to articles in J5 is suggested by Fourcade et al. (2015, Figure 4), showing 
that the AER and QJE have increased in relative importance since the early 1980s, while the JPE and 
Econometrica have decreased in relative importance (measured as shares of total citations to publications 
in the journal).33 This history, while very useful, does not consider differences across journals in the number 
of issues, articles per issue and length of articles. To account for these differences in the samples of articles 
in J5 in 1974-75 and 2007-08, I calculate each journal’s citations per AER2008-equivalent page, thus 
focusing not on the overall contribution of each journal, but instead on the attention paid to each published 
paper adjusted for its length. The resulting statistics might be viewed as article-based long-term impact 
factors.34 
                                                             
33See Laband (2013) for a discussion and references on rankings of journals in economics. 
  
34Looking at different points in the distributions of these statistics yields the same inferences. 
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 Mean citations per AER2008-equivalent page to articles published in 1974-75 in the five journals 
are: AER, 7.0; Econometrica, 4.7; JPE, 9.4; QJE, 3.4; and REStud, 3.6. The mean citations per equivalent 
page in the 2007-08 sample are: AER, 2.3; Econometrica, 2.1; JPE, 2.0; QJE, 2.7; and REStud, 1.1.35 These 
calculations reinforce the inference that the QJE has increased in influence over this period, while the 
influence of articles published in the JPE and the REStud has decreased. Indeed, given that the REStud is 
such an outlier today, perhaps it makes sense for economists to refer to the “Top 4” journals and restrict the 
elite group in our discussions. 
More important, however, we devote excessive attention, and excessive rewards, to publications in 
the J5. Inspired by Oswald (2007), consider articles published in the Economic Journal and the Review of 
Economics and Statistics in 2007-08, the same years as the later sample of J5, and using the same selection 
criteria (10+ pages, all in regular issues of journals, no comments, citations through calendar 2014).36 
Obtaining the WoS citations to each of the 230 articles in this sample, I assigned each its percentile position 
in the distribution of J5 citations per AER2008-page equivalent. While the citations per page of the median-
cited article in these journals ranks “only” at the 29th percentile of articles in the J5 (average citations per 
AER2008-equivalent page of 1.27), as Figure 7 shows there is substantial overlap with citations to J5 
publications:  Many articles in these two “lesser” general journals are cited more than the majority of articles 
published in J5, a result that holds for scholarly journals more generally (Stern, 2013).37  
                                                             
35Since the averages are based on citations through 2014, the citation counts for the earlier sample exceed those for 
the later sample. The opposite would be true if we only use the first seven years of citations to articles in the earlier 
sample, but the relative ranking of the journals in that earlier period would remain unchanged. 
 
36Oswald (2007) compared articles in one issue each of the Economic Journal, Journal of Public Economics, Journal 
of Industrial Economics, and the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, to citations to articles in one 
contemporaneous issue each of Econometrica and the American Economic Review. Similar overlaps, and the 
importance of paying attention to individual articles rather than merely the journals in which an article appears, is 
demonstrated for economic history by Di Vaio et al. (2012). 
 
37As with the comparison to J5, there are substantial differences between these two journals. The median article in the 
EJ would be at the 23rd percentile of articles in J5, while the median article in the REStat would be at the 38th percentile. 
But one-fourth of the EJ articles are cited more per page than the median REStat article. 
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Just as there is substantial overlap in quality across economics faculties, so too there is substantial 
overlap in scholarly influence across journals. The main reason that a few economics journals are ranked 
more highly than all others is that a very few papers in these journals generate immensely more citations 
than other papers published in those journals or elsewhere. A very few outliers determine our perceptions 
of journal quality, perceptions that ignore the tremendous heterogeneity of articles within and across 
journals. (See also Verma, 2015.) 
 The WoS publishes “journal impact factors,” measuring for each journal in Year t the average 
citations per article published in Years t-1 and t-2 (although five-year impact factors, counting citations to 
articles published in Years t-1 through t-5, are also presented). Note first that impact factors ignore the 
heterogeneity in citations to individual articles across journals demonstrated above. Also, as Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2004) point out, ranking systems based on impact factors lack any basis in economic 
theory and are just one of very many ways of ranking journals’ influence.  
The very short rear-view of the two-year calculation of impact factors severely disadvantages 
articles in economics compared to the “hard” sciences, given the extremely long lags between acceptance 
of an economics article and its publication. Indeed, even comparing within the social sciences this short 
rear-view and economists’ stinginess with citations disadvantages economics: The AER’s two-year impact 
factor was 3.3 in 2013, while those of the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of 
Sociology were 3.8 and 4.3 respectively. As broad indicators within a discipline, journal impact factors are 
useful, but they are of little use comparing across disciplines. Most important, they ignore the heterogeneity 
of the influence of articles published in the same journal. 
4. Citations, Outcomes and Behavior 
Citation analysis has been used in various ways to study outcomes within the economics profession 
and to examine more general issues that economists have focused on. Here I consider only the former: How 
citations—professional reputation—affect economists’ earnings and other rewards; how they have been 
used to pinpoint the importance of various scholarly contributions of major figures in the history of 
economic thought; and how subsequent citations have been used to examine the validity of decisions by 
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editors and professional committees about what to publish and whom to reward. I do not review the 
substantial literature in economics on innovation and patent citations, based on citations to research in the 
natural sciences (see, e.g., Trajtenberg, 1990); the sparse literature using citation analysis to understand the 
life cycle of scientists’ productivity (see, e.g., Levin and Stephan, 1991), nor the still sparser research 
program on the economics of legal institutions (Posner, 2000). 
4.1 Salaries 
A large literature has arisen examining the determinants of economists’ salaries, both in terms of 
the usual human capital inputs and direct measures of production (articles and books). Early examples of 
this genre are Johnson and Stafford (1974), Tuckman and Leahey (1975) and Hansen et al. (1978). My 
purpose in this sub-section is not to summarize this literature; instead, I focus on the much smaller part that 
has examined how citations affect salaries and whether their effects are independent of the role of numbers 
and quality of publications per se. 
Examining the role of citations in determining academic salaries is interesting for several reasons.  
First, since the purpose of scholarship is to generate knowledge, and generated knowledge is reflected in 
citations, examining the impact of citations on salaries provides information on whether monetary 
incentives are in line with what we implicitly believe should be rewarded. Second, while other criteria 
should and will help determine salaries, a demonstration that citations as a measure of productivity are an 
important independent determinant might reassure scholars that objective reflections of their intellectual 
activities matter and that some notion of equity prevails in salary determination.   
Estimating equations describing wage determination has been the stock-in-trade of labor 
economists for nearly a half century, with the basic equation including human capital measures—
experience and educational attainment. All the studies discussed here included quadratics in (post-Ph.D.) 
experience, and all ignored educational attainment, since nearly all sample members have Ph.D. degrees. 
In all cases the dependent variable was the logarithm of nine-month salary. 
There is a certain probably unavoidable homogeneity and narrowness in the salary-citations 
literature. Most important, because information on individuals’ remuneration in private universities and 
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colleges is not publicly available, all of the studies are based on economics faculties in public institutions; 
and only one is based on non-U.S. data. At the very least, results cannot be extrapolated to salary-setting 
outside the public sector. Moreover, the institutions studied are typically among the larger and more 
prestigious state schools, so that the results should not be extrapolated to salary determination in less well-
known public institutions. Also, and no doubt because of the difficulties in obtaining data in the pre-internet 
age, only the most recent studies have fairly large samples of institutions and faculty members. 
All studies attempt to measure the impacts of citations only on university salaries, usually only 
academic-year salaries. (Twelve-month salaries of “low-level” administrators were typically de-annualized 
for estimation, and “higher-level” administrators were typically excluded.) Thus outside professional 
income—e.g., from research grants, consulting, or book royalties—is not included (although Chan et al., 
2014b, show that in academe generally the more heavily-cited receive higher non-academic earnings). To 
the extent that those who are more heavily cited obtain more than proportionate additional income from 
these sources, which seems likely, the estimated impacts of citations on salaries may understate their 
impacts on total professional income. 
All of the studies summarized here used WoS (typically only SSCI) citation counts (since GS 
counts were not available at the time when most were conducted). Given the comparisons in Section 2, the 
reliance on the WoS instead of GS probably causes little bias. In both, however, as pointed out above, the 
difficulty in counting citations to frequently-appearing surnames may produce problems. Including these 
scholars in a study could introduce the errors into the estimated impacts of citations, while excluding them, 
as a few studies did, may have generated biased estimates of the nonlinear returns to citations if their 
citations depart from the average. 
Within the WoS in these studies researchers had to choose the length of the individuals’ citation 
history to include in the estimation. In more recent research the choice was almost surely dictated by the 
much easier accessibility of (professional) lifetime than of annual citation counts. The opposite was true 
for pre-internet studies, when counting citations in annual hard-copy compendia made obtaining lifetime 
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counts much more difficult. Thus it is not surprising that earlier studies used a few recent years of citation 
counts, while more recent studies used lifetime totals. 
Table 9 presents in chronological order a summary of the twelve studies of U.S. institutions and 
one of Ontario universities that included citations as determinants of economists’ salaries. Each holds 
constant a set of covariates that are listed in the table, and for each study I indicate in the last column its 
novelty in the literature. Most important, in the penultimate column in the table I summarize the impact of 
a ten-percent increase in the citation measure on the average sample member’s academic-year salary. The 
most important result answers the question whether citations matter in salary determination.  Even in the 
first study of citations and salaries in economics (Hamermesh et al., 1982, which built upon Holtmann and 
Bayer, 1970, for the physical sciences), citations had a substantial positive impact on salaries at the same 
post-Ph.D. experience. A two-standard deviation in annual citations in that sample implied a nearly forty 
percent difference in salaries. While the estimates obviously differ across studies, within those differences 
they seem remarkably consistent, suggesting unequivocally that, through whatever mechanism, additional 
citations do increase salary. 
Do citations increase salaries themselves, or is it simply that publication in “higher-quality” 
journals is rewarded and is positively correlated with citations? Some of the studies in Table 9, beginning 
with Sauer (1988), included covariates indicating the number, length and journal level of each scholar’s 
publications. Even in those cases, as the Moore et al. (1998), Baser and Pema (2003), Bratsberg et al. (2010), 
Hilmer et al. (2015),  Gibson et al. (2015) studies, and the Sen et al. (2010) data, also suggest, the evidence 
generally suggests that citations have an independent impact on salaries. 
Are all citations created equal, or does being cited in higher-quality journals (presumably by articles 
that themselves receive more scholarly attention) have a greater impact on salary? Kenny and Studley 
(1995) adjusted each citation in their counts by the impact factor of the journal where the citing article 
appeared. While they did not report effects of raw citation counts on salaries, the fact that the implied effect 
of their adjusted citation measure differed little from others shown in the table suggests that the locus of the 
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citation is unimportant.38 Moreover, a search over various values of discount rates implied that no 
discounting of citations exists (at least in salary-setting). Taken together, the results suggest that, in terms 
of impacts on salaries, a citation is a citation. The answer to the initial question of this paragraph is that 
citations alone independently affect salary, but much of their effect is through the average quality of the 
journal where an article appears. Nor does having citations concentrated on a few “home runs” have an 
extra impact on salary (Hamermesh and Pfann, 2012).  
Books are not the major vehicle of scholarly communication in economics, and citations to them 
have been decreasing relative to journal articles (Rauber and Ursprung, 2008); but citations to them are 
included in GS totals.39 No study of economists’ salaries has separated out citations to books from those to 
articles, so the question of their role in salary-setting has not yet been answered. Indeed, the evidence on 
whether the publication of books itself even increases the academic salaries of economists is unclear, 
although some fairly convincing evidence (Ragan et al., 1999) for a small sample of public universities 
suggests that additional books and articles both increase salaries. 
Does it matter when one’s work is cited? Siow (1991) showed that the impact on lifetime salary is 
greater for citations received earlier in one’s career.  Given the evidence in Section 3 that most publications 
either “make a hit” or disappear from view, this suggests that earlier publication generates greater lifetime 
income. Whether this unsurprising result arises from the attention that early-publishing scholars achieve 
relative to their equally successful colleagues who publish later in their careers, or because academic 
salaries seem to be capped by within-university social norms, is unclear. Do incremental citations lead to 
incremental increases in salary, or is it merely that better scholars generally produce more citations and 
receive higher salaries? Hamermesh (1989) used longitudinal data to estimate models with person fixed 
effects and showed that much of the cross-section impact of citations on salaries remains. 
                                                             
38A similar adjustment by Bodenhorn (2003) hardly altered the citation-based ranking of economics departments in 
liberal-arts colleges. 
 
39A book was the most-cited work of two of the five most-cited economists in the sample of 1043 faculty members. 
Jin and Choi (2014) provide other evidence of the importance of books. 
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One might think that the market allocates talent so that the quality of scholars is lexicographic in 
school quality, and that the top schools are richer and pay higher salaries generally. (Of course, this implicit 
assumption about the allocation of academic talent is sharply contradicted by the evidence on x* in Table 
8.) Several of the tabulated studies include institution fixed effects, so that any estimated impact on salaries 
was within-faculty. The estimates clearly show that, even within an economics department, being cited 
more raises one’s salary relative to otherwise observationally identical colleagues, other things equal.  
Currently the citation count of each author of a co-authored article is increased when their article 
is cited. This practice and the apparent impact of citations on salaries leads to the question of whether 
citations affect salaries regardless of the number of authors of the cited article. The first article to examine 
this issue (Sauer, 1988) suggested that the returns to citations to a two-authored article were almost exactly 
half of those to citations to a solo-authored paper. (This result is consistent with the finding in Section 3 
that in the 1970s the marginal productivity of an additional author was about zero.) Hilmer et al. (2015) 
examined the same issue, with results suggesting that citation counts are not discounted for co-authorship. 
This finding suggests market behavior that is inconsistent with the evidence in Section 3 on the marginal 
productivity of an additional author of articles published in 2007-08. 
This literature raises the question why citation rates have independent (of the quantity and quality 
of publications) effects on salary. Most schools (Klein and Chiang, 2004, Hamermesh and Pfann, 2012) do 
not regularly obtain citation information for annual merit reviews, and Liebowitz (2014) reported on a 
similar survey of forty-six department chairs showing that citations are considered less important in 
decisions about promotion to full professor than are the outlets where the candidates’ articles appeared. One 
explanation is that, in a profession with substantial threatened and actual mobility, citations contribute 
directly to reputation which in turn enhances salaries through implicit market pressure. 
4.2 Other Market Outcomes  
The various studies of the impact of citations on salaries were made commensurable using an 
elasticity-like measure. Other effects of citations are too diverse to allow direct numerical comparisons. 
The nearest to the salary studies are the several pieces of research that have examined how citations affect 
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the likelihood of promotion, usually in the context of measuring gender differentials. Thus Ginther and 
Kahn (2004), using a sample of junior economists, showed that additional WoS citations, holding article 
quantity and quality constant, do increase the probability of having a tenured academic position ten years 
post-Ph.D., but the impact is small and statistically insignificant. Using GS data, de Paola and Scoppa 
(2015) showed that selections by boards of examiners for appointments as associate or full professor in 
Italy are very sensitive to the candidates’ h-statistics. 
The age of citations might be viewed as an indicator of the rate of technical progress in a sub-
specialty (or, taking a dimmer view, as showing the rate at which new fads appear). McDowell et al. (2011) 
used longitudinal data on the age of citations across eight sub-fields to examine individuals’ choices about 
whether to become a department chair and about activities post-chair position. Economists working in sub-
fields in which citation age indicates more rapid depreciation of knowledge are less likely to become 
department heads; but if they do, they exit the position more slowly and are more likely to become higher-
level administrators. Similar apparent rationality is shown by economists’ choices about how to treat 
refereeing requests. Those whose work is more heavily cited take longer to referee and are more likely to 
refuse editors’ refereeing requests (Hamermesh, 1995). Not only do additional citations affect salary; these 
results suggest that economists behave as if citations proxy the value of their time. 
A substantial literature has examined whether scholarly achievement, as indicated by citations, 
affects the likelihood that an individual receives some academic honor or award. Effects on rewards may 
be especially important, given limits on monetary returns in academe and the visibility of awards and 
honors. There are two groups of decision-makers who determine these outcomes: Small committees (of 
oligarchs) that select individuals for awards (such as Nobel Prizes; AEA Distinguished Fellows, Clark 
Medalists and Presidents; and their European and other foreign equivalents) and electorates that explicitly 
choose among small sets of pre-selected candidates (e.g., for AEA vice-president or Executive Committee 
membership, or Econometric Society Fellow). The questions here are whether the choices of each type of 
decision-maker are at least partly based on achievement, measured by citations, and whether the importance 
of citations in these choices generally differs between the two types. 
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One might argue that scholarly achievement alone should determine choices of committees making 
selections for candidates in elections where voters determine outcomes or directly for awards/positions. 
The evidence does make it clear that scholarly achievement, as reflected by citations to the awardees’ work, 
is important in these choices. Thus Diamond and Toth (2007) showed that those AEA Presidents who have 
been selected from among earlier Executive Committee members have been more heavily (WoS) cited, 
conditional on the quantity of publications, age, location and Ph.D. “pedigree,” than others. Similarly, 
Hamermesh and Pfann (2012) demonstrated that among all full professors at 88 economics departments, 
those who are awarded Nobel Prizes, named AEA Distinguished Fellow or President, or Clark Medalist, 
have been more heavily (WoS) cited, conditional on a vector of their other characteristics. Given the sample 
size this result is unsurprising; but conditional on the total citation count, having more heavily concentrated 
citations—more “home runs”—also increases the likelihood of selection. 
Relative citation rates also partly determine outcomes of elections in which association members 
or prior electoral winners vote for awards. Thus in a regional economics association in which voters chose 
within pairs of candidates, individual voters tended to choose candidates with higher relative citation rates 
(although various affinities, particularly gender among female voters, mitigated or even vitiated the 
importance of relative citations, as Dillingham et al., 1994, showed). Similar results, and a similar 
importance of gender, is shown by outcomes of the four-person elections for AEA Vice-Presidents and 
Executive Committee members (Donald and Hamermesh, 2006). In elections of Econometric Society 
Fellows, the more heavily-cited nominees from among lists that typically included around fifty economists 
were more likely to obtain the requisite thirty percent approval votes (Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003). 
Scholarly achievement, as measured by others’ citations to one’s publications, is a major 
determinant of awards, honors and elections in the economics profession, regardless of whether these 
outcomes are determined by committees or electorates. Candidates’ other characteristics are also important 
determinants, and no doubt one’s marketing efforts and the parochial preferences of committees or voters 
matter too. People can differ about the appropriate relative importance of scholarly achievement compared 
to these other factors, but the explicit recognition of one’s work by other scholars matters in these contexts. 
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4.3 Citations in the History of Economic Thought 
Citation analysis has been used to evaluate the contributions of economists who are viewed today 
as historical figures, with the general aim being to infer both the magnitudes and the time paths of their 
influences on subsequent economic research. I organize this literature by whether the focus is on the total 
oeuvre of the historical figure or on some economic concept or construct that may have more than one 
origin, dealing with each in chronological order. Some of these studies are based on citation counts from 
one of the sources discussed here, but many are based on direct counts by the author from samples of 
journals (as in Stigler and Friedland, 1975). The former approach misses attributions that are not formally 
in footnotes or reference lists (e.g., the use of the term Marshallian), and even the latter approach catches 
these only if the historian of economic thought reads through all the potentially citing articles. Before 
discussing specific individuals and ideas, however, it is worth noting that Weinberg and Galenson (2005), 
using citations to economics Nobel Prize winners, showed that more empirically oriented scholars among 
this highly elite group did their most important work much later in life than those who created new, more 
abstract concepts.  
Wight (2002) looked at journal articles’ references to Adam Smith in the last third of the 20th 
century, including directly counting as citations the use of terms like “Smithian” and “Smith’s” if the 
work/ideas cited were clearly those of Adam Smith. The fraction of journal articles referring to Smith’s 
work showed a steady increase through the end of the 20th century. No similar trend was observed by direct 
counts of SSCI citations, but, unlike citations to Malthus or Ricardo during this period, those to Smith did 
not decrease as a fraction of total SSCI citations. Clearly, there was something of a continuing Smith 
renascence during this period, perhaps stimulated by the 1976 bicentennial of the Wealth of Nations. 
Biddle (1996) sampled articles in major journals from 1908-1950 to consider the influence of 
Wesley Clair Mitchell, most well-known today for his economic and statistical work on business cycles. 
Citations to Mitchell peaked during the 1930s (due to scholarly interest in the Great Depression?) but had 
tapered off by 1950. Sic transit gloria mundi. Using WoS citation counts Diamond (2004) examined the 
influence of Zvi Griliches’ research on subsequent scholars of technology, innovation and growth. As with 
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most economists’ work, citations to Griliches’ research increased initially, then fell off, except for the 
classic paper on hybrid corn (Griliches, 1957), which showed a nearly monotonic increase in citations 
through the early 2000s. This is one of the extremely rare papers for which the gloria did not seem to transit. 
Duarte (2009) examined articles in major journals and in a few books to consider the role of 
Ramsey’s 1928 growth model on subsequent economic thought. After being essentially ignored for 20 
years, Ramsay’s work on economic growth attracted large and rapidly growing numbers of citations 
beginning in the late 1950s. Interest peaked in the early 1970s with the boom in formal models of growth, 
then tapered off rapidly in the late 1970s as focus shifted away from those models. Stigler (1978) examined 
the use of the concept of the kinked oligopoly demand curve in subsequent literature. This idea, which 
surfaced in the late 1930s in the work of several economists, quickly commanded the attention of many 
other scholars, reaching a peak in the boom in neoclassical economics in the 1960s. By the 1970s, however, 
interest in it had diminished, probably as the use of game-theoretic approaches to understand non-
competitive behavior became widespread.  
Hoover (2014) searched through published articles and books to estimate the influence of Trygve 
Haavelmo’s “probability approach” to econometrics that was laid out in several articles in the early 1940s. 
As with most important contributions, its widespread and growing acceptance in its first post-publication 
decade was following by a decline in interest. In the decade before Haavelmo’s 1989 Nobel Prize, however, 
there was a resurgence of attention to the work, perhaps because of the growing controversy over “structural 
estimation,” a resurgence that had not tapered off much by the early 2000s. Diamond (1988) employed the 
SSCI to examine citations to Gerard Debreu’s work, particularly that on general equilibrium. The 
interesting focus was not on the time path of citations to this idea, but rather on the type of research that 
referenced it: Almost none of its influence was on subsequent empirical research—the research that cited 
it remained essentially isolated within the theory community. Finally, Claveau and Gingras (2017) used 
WoS citations to articles published from the 1950s onward to create what are essentially optimal partitions 
of the economic literature by sub-field, demonstrating the longevity of many sub-fields and the rise and fall 
of a few others, e.g., growth theory. 
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This is a fairly sparse literature; but it is one with substantial scope for additional work—the number 
of historical figures in economics is obviously increasing! With the growth and increasing ease of use of 
databases of citations, and, one might hope, with no further decline in economists’ focus on the origin of 
the ideas that underlie current research, citation analyses of economic-historical figures and ideas might 
accelerate. 
4.4 Judging Editorial and Committee Decisions by Subsequent Citations 
Since citations are a measure of quality, subsequent citations can provide a useful check on 
decisions about publishing, presenting awards, promotions and other outcomes. Many journals give awards 
(plaques or small honoraria) to the “best article” of the year. These awards are typically chosen by editorial 
or association committees. Are they given to the article with the most impact, or even to articles with 
impacts above the median? Coupé (2013) showed that award-winning papers are more likely than others to 
be the most WoS or GS-cited articles in a volume, but very few are the most-cited paper in a volume. Since 
the very fact that an article received an award may stimulate additional subsequent citations, this evidence 
suggests a somewhat tenuous relation to the citations that an article would have received absent the prize 
itself. 
While we showed that several awards are partly determined by authors’ prior citations, one might 
wonder how well selection committees and voters succeed in choosing one or several winners among a set 
of similar candidates. Using Clark Medalists and newly-elected Econometric Society Fellows, Chan et al. 
(2014a) estimate double-differences between them and arguably comparable economists pre- and post-
selection/election. The awardees/winners generate more and better subsequent citations than the control 
group, and even more citations per publication. Whether this double-difference reflects the perspicacity of 
committees and voters about awardees’/winners’ staying power, or simply that their “victory” per se leads 
others to cite their works more frequently, is unknowable from this statistical design.  
The very acceptance of an article is itself an “award,” especially given the low acceptance rates 
even at second-level economics journals. Are these awards conferred based on successful perceptions of 
quality, or do they reflect, as so many economists believe (especially when their paper is rejected!) editorial 
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favoritism—toward friends and colleagues? Laband and Piette (1994) show that five-year WoS citations 
are greater, conditional on authors’ prior citations, to papers in top economics journals when the author and 
editor have some kind of connection—as student or colleague. Similar results are obtained by Colussi 
(2015), using eight years of post-publication WoS citations, and by Brogaard et al. (2014) using a much 
larger sample, defining “connection” as being colleagues with an editor, and accounting for school and even 
author fixed effects.  
Editors’ choices also do not seem to be biased toward accepting papers that cite the editors’ own 
articles more. While it is true that scholars receive more citations in those journals and at those times when 
they are editing, a keyword count (Kim and Koh, 2014) suggests that these fillips to their citation counts 
do not arise from their choosing papers that cite them a lot.  Perhaps instead authors select their submissions 
based on editorial interests, which guarantees more citations to the editor during his/her tenure. 
There is no question that an article’s place in a journal issue matters: Lead articles receive many 
more citations than do subsequent articles (Smart and Waldfogel, 1996). But is this because their visibility 
leads readers to cite them more, or because editors’ decisions to place them in the lead reflects editorial 
beliefs about their quality, which are then validated in the market for research? Using a journal that ordered 
papers alphabetically (by author’s surname) in some issues, by editorial choice in others, Coupé et al. (2010) 
showed that about two-thirds of a lead article’s extra citations were due to its position, one-third to its 
inherent higher quality than subsequently placed articles in the same issue. 
How we write our papers matters for their impact on others’ research. Taking a truncated sample 
of the top 1000 citation- and paper-ranked economists in the RePEc database, Olney (2017) shows, 
controlling for many individual differences, that those who are native English speakers are ranked higher. 
Even the title that one chooses for an article affects its subsequent (six-year, WoS) citations, suggesting that 
authors and editors should pay attention to the first thing that readers see in a journal article. Taking the 
three leading U.S. general journals, Mialon (2015) classifies articles as having a “poetic” title, one that 
includes some poetic device or figure of speech, as opposed to a purely informative title. The former are 
more heavily cited in the first six post-publication years, conditional on their authors’ prior citations, but 
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only among empirical papers. Finally, articles that draw from a wider literature of not directly networked 
research, perhaps a measure of innovativeness, are themselves more heavily cited subsequently (Boppart 
and Staub, 2016). 
5. Main Points and Implications 
Citations are just one possible measure of academic productivity; but they are a quantifiable and 
essentially market-based way of distinguishing among different participants in a particular academic 
enterprise. Obtaining accurate citations counts by whatever method—be it the WoS, GS profiles, RePEc or 
counting each person’s most-cited articles, requires substantial effort to ensure accuracy. The gratifying 
result here is that the particular citation count or statistic chosen yields a ranking that is very similar to other 
counts or rankings. Thus, for example, there is a very tight relationship between citation counts using the 
WoS and GS sources. So long as great care is taken in measuring people’s productivity by counting 
citations, individuals and institutions can be ranked appropriately and similarly using a number of different 
metrics. So too, any of these carefully constructed measures can be used to examine the relationship 
between this proxy for academic influence and outcomes in academe. 
The overarching result throughout much of this article was the heterogeneity of citation counts 
across units being studied. There is substantial overlap in citations of articles that are published in journals 
that are viewed as being of different quality. Many of the articles in top journals receive little attention 
(though on average they receive more attention than those in lower-ranked journals). So too, many 
economists at lower-ranked faculties within what is already an elite group are cited more than the median 
faculty members at higher-ranked schools (though on average the former are cited less frequently than the 
latter). Indeed, these overlaps are the best justifications for examining citations—they allow for studying 
the achievements of individuals and their research instead of relying on opinions about average reputations 
of journals and institutions. 
Fortunately the market for economists implicitly recognizes the importance of citations, since they 
help determine economists’ pay independently of the quantity and perceived quality of the articles that 
economists publish. But, while citations do matter in the market, do they matter enough, especially in salary-
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setting, promotions and appointments? I would argue that they do not, and that the profession puts too much 
weight on publications in a few top journals. At a time when acceptance rates at the “Top Five” journals 
are around five percent, relying on editors’ parochial preferences in choosing which articles to publish when 
we assign credit in this profession may be inferior to letting the market for ideas, as reflected in citations, 
bear more weight in assigning elite monetary and reputational rewards. Indeed, that citations appear to 
matter more than the mere quantity or even the journal quality of publications in determining non-monetary 
rewards suggests that in certain circumstances this reflection of the market attains a greater importance. 
No doubt the importance of average journal quality in salary and other decisions is due to the greater 
ease of obtaining information about it than about citations. What could be done to enhance the use of 
citations as measures of academic impact, to account for the obvious heterogeneity across articles, 
individuals and institutions? Asking faculty members to count and report citations annually is both 
demeaning and a creator of tedium (and unlikely to be successful). But asking faculty to register and create 
a GS profile gives them a simple discrete task and allows administrators to obtain and, I hope, use annual 
information on scholarly impact in determining salaries of current faculty and in targeting faculty elsewhere 
as potential recruits.  
I am not arguing that citations should be the only determinant of rewards in economics. Indeed, a 
greater reliance on citations will lead some academics to increase their efforts to game the system to raise 
their citation counts. Rather, I am merely arguing that their impact is currently undervalued, a situation that 
is easily remediable. We remain at a point where the provision and use of more information on measured 
impacts of scholarly work would be better than less. 
Economists have conducted a lot of research on the sociology of the economics profession, and 
research on how to count citations, citation-based rankings and citations as determinants of outcomes has 
burgeoned. Particularly interesting would be studies paralleling those summarized in Table 9, but 
concentrating on salary determination in private institutions. Is the impact of citations greater or less there 
than what has been found for public schools? Do citations affect one’s ability to obtain grant money or 
other non-nine-month professional income? In other words, do the percentage payoffs summarized in Table 
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9 under- or overstate the returns to scholarly impact generally? The growth of web-based citation counts 
has made answers to these and other questions related to citations more readily obtainable. 
Perhaps this judgment is too harsh, but very little of the research on the role of citations in 
economics has been used to shed light on more general economic issues. Just as the economics of particular 
sports has been used to study general issues in the functioning of labor and product markets, there is a lot 
of research to be done in which the empirical study of our citation practices can lead to greater 
understanding of such issues. Indeed, the general analysis of such diverse topics as the role of norms of 
interpersonal behavior, how discourse alters market behavior, and others, might be fruitfully studied using 
citation analyses as examples. In short, there is room for broad-ranging and broadly applicable research 
using citations in this profession.  
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http://apps.webofknowledge.com/WOS_GeneralSearch_input.do?product=WOS&search_mode=
GeneralSearch&SID=3FjfjXSbrzIWDHD7U5a&preferencesSaved= 
Results found: 150 
 
Sum of the Times Cited [?] : 2922 
Sum of Times Cited without self-citations [?] : 2770  
 
Citing Articles [?] : 2395 
Citing Articles without self-citations [?] : 2321 
 
Average Citations per Item [?] : 19.48 
 
h-index [?] : 28 
 
Figure 1. Screen from a May 2016 Search in the Web of Science 
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https://scholar.google.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citation indices All Since 2011 
Citations  18186 5773 
h-index  63 38 
i10-index  171 90 
 
Figure 2. Screen from a May 2016 Search in Google Scholar 
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WoSCitations = 7.860 + 0.182 GSCitations, Adj. R2 = 0.856, N = 486 
     (0.930)  (0.0034) 
 
Figure 4.  Relation between WoS Citations and Google Scholar Citations, Articles in J5 
Journals, 2007-08* 
 
*Excludes 11 articles with 1000+ GS citations. 
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WoSCitations = -0.318 + 0.173 GSCitations , Adj. R2 = 0.909, N = 102 
     (2.81)   (0.0055) 
 
Figure 5.  Relation between WoS Citations and Google Scholar Citations, Faculty in “Top 
Schools,” Ph.D. 2006 or Later* 
 
*Excludes 7 faculty with 2000+ GS citations.
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Table 1.  Rank Correlations, Citation Measures from Google Scholar* 
             All Faculty (N = 543)  
  
 
i10 Total C5 Citations 
h 0.989 0.967 0.933 
i10       ------- 0.951 0.913 
Total Citations       ------- -------- 0.982 
    
    
        Ph.D. > 2004 (N = 195)  
  
 
i10 Total C5 Citations 
h 0.973 0.926 0.884 
i10       --------         0.929 0.893 
Total Citations       --------        ------- 0.992 
    
           Ph.D. <2005 (N = 348)  
  
 
i10 Total C5 Citations 
h 0.971 0.932 0.843 
i10      -------- 0.884 0.783 
Total Citations      -------- ------- 0.959 
 
  
57 
 
Table 2.  Distribution of Citation Measures of Faculty in 30 “Top” Economics Departments 
           Citation Statistic 
  
                                   C5 Total h i10    
        
Mean  3013 8395 25 42    
Std. Error  (171) 
(831) (0.98) (2.74)    
10th Percentile  54 105 5 3   
Median  1078 2101 17 20    
90th Percentile  7931 21,2105 55 100    
95th Percentile  13,149 39,844 70 142   
99th Percentile  25,688 103,727 117 278   
Range  [0, 66,118] 
[0, 214,046] [0, 171] [0, 754]    
N  1043 543 543 543   
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Table 3. Experience Profiles of Citation Measures in 30 “Top” Economics Departments 
          h (N = 543)                                                   C5 (N = 1043) 
Experience         
  Mean 
10th 
percentile Median 
90th 
percentile  Mean 
10th 
percentile Median 
90th 
percentile 
 0-1 2.8 0 2 6 40 1 16 86 
2 3.8 1 4 7 103 3 55 325 
3 4.5 2 4 8 109 10 42 306 
4 5.7 2 5 9 141 19 80 338 
5 5.8 2 6 9 176          20 124 394 
6 9.1 5 8 15 306 34 206 702 
7-8 10.3 5 9 16 465 82 280 1233 
9-10 12.7 7 12 19 687 120 555 1479 
 11-12 14.7 8 13 23 1043 190 829 2257 
 13-15 20.0 12 19 33 1571 356 1027 3212 
 16-20 26.2 13 23 47 2423 449 1435 6866 
 21-25 30.5 13 28 55 3699 531 2381 8242 
 26-30 42.3 20 35 76 6098 842 3681 14113 
 31-35 48.0 27 38 82 5716 643 3452 16146 
 36-40 45.1 22 43 67 5172 587 3223 12652 
 41-45 56.1 17 54 96 7111 458 4270 19004 
 46+  67.1 27 62 171 6498 728 3418 15342 
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Table 4. Women and Citations, Means and Regression Estimates*  
   Experience>17         Experience<18 
Mean:     
     
Fraction Female   0.09  0.19  
     
C5 Citations  5223  706  
     
Ind. Var.:     
Female -459 -352.5    -9.0   0.48 
 (704)   (577)   (66.6) (72.6) 
     
Rank of  -166.5  -34.3 
 Dept.     (18.4)    (4.9) 
     
Pseudo- R2 0.019 0.108   0.257 0.277 
     
N  521  521    522  522 
 
*These LAD regressions include a large vector of indicators of post-Ph.D. experience. 
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Figure 6a.  Distribution of Citations per AER2008-Equivalent Page, J5 Articles, 1974-75* 
 
 
Figure 6b.  Distribution of Citations per AER2008-Equivalent Page, J5 Articles, 2007-08 
 
*Excludes the top 4 percent of papers, with citations/equivalent page greater than 25 
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Table 5.  “Resurrections” and “Flashes in the Pan” of J5 Articles 1974-75, N=444 
 
     Rank in Most Recent 20 Years 
       Mean Maximum     90th Percentile    Median    10th Percentile    Minimum 
Rank in  
  First 10 Years 
  
Bottom Ventile              372     244  295  372  424  426 
Bottom Decile  366     235  288  366  426  441 
9th Decile  339       90  217  363  431  442 
  
2th Decile  115        9   28    80  234  389 
Top Decile    46        1     4    31  109  187 
Top Ventile    28        1     2    18    84  117 
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Table 6.  Citations through 2014 by Number of Authors, J5 Articles, 1974-
75 and 2007-08*  
 
  N Authors 1 2 3+    
       
   1974-75    
       
Mean  78.2 72.0 38.4    
Std. Error  (12.2) (9.9) (23.5)    
Median  20 38 10    
90th Percentile  171 164 88    
Range  [0,2466] [0, 679] [0, 435]    
N  312 114 18   
       
  
 
   2007-08    
       
  N Authors 1 2 3 4+  
       
Mean  41.2 48.5 61.7 72.7  
Std. Error  (3.2) (3.4) (6.3) (2.9)  
Median  28 33 44 61  
90th Percentile  86 105 128 168  
Range  [3, 206] [2, 478] [0, 365] [9, 193]  
N  134 246 94 23  
 
*Excludes papers from 1974-75 that were fewer than 5 nominal pages long, fewer than 10 nominal pages long in 
2007-08. 
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Table 7.  SSCI Citations per Article by Type in J5 Journals, 1974-75 and 2007-08* 
       1974-75 Publications, First 7 Years* 
  Theory Empirical 
Econometric 
Theory   
     
Mean 12.8 16.7 8.5  
Std. Error (1.3) (1.9) (1.3)  
Median  6 11 6  
90th Percentile 29 38 25  
Range [0, 171] [0, 109] [0, 39]  
N 280 113 46  
 
     2007-08 Publications, First 7 Years  
  Theory 
Theory w/ 
Simulation 
Empirical: 
Borrowed 
Data 
Empirical: 
Own Data 
Experi- 
mental 
Economet- 
ric Theory  
 
        
Mean 33.5 60.5 65.2 54.7 64.9 46.2  
Std. Error (2.9) (9.3) (5.7) (5.4) (7.9) (6.8)  
Median 24 43 47 40 50 37  
90th Percentile 63 120 147 99 123 110  
Range [2, 304] [0, 478] [4, 348] [4, 365] [11, 281] [4, 179]  
N 176 55 99 95 39 33  
 
   1974-75 Publications, Citations through 2014* 
  Theory Empirical 
Econometric 
Theory   
     
Mean 78.1 83.3 41.7  
Std. Error (13.2) (12.8) (8.9)  
Median 20 37 21  
90th Percentile 160 186 141  
Range [0, 2466] [0, 879] [0, 259]  
N 280 113 46  
 
*Excludes 5 articles that were not classifiable under any of these rubrics. 
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Table 8. Rankings and Overlaps in Faculty Quality across the Top 30 Economics 
Departments, Based on GS Citations to Each Author’s Five Most-Cited Publications (C5), 
and Ranks Using 50th or 90th Centiles 
SCHOOL N rd50 C550 KMS x* rd90 r*d50 
        
Harvard  51 1 7000 1 ---- 1 1 
Princeton 52 2 2534 7 0 4 4 
Chicago 26 3 2373 2 1 11 6 
Stanford 40 4 2272 8 2 10 5 
MIT  30 5 2115 3 4 2  2 
Berkeley  41 6 1894 9 4 9 3 
NYU 46 7 1737 10 5 7 14 
Columbia 45 8 1693 11 6 5 7 
Maryland 34 9 1596 25 7 25  18 
Yale 42 10 1560 6 8 12 10 
San Diego 39 11 1413 12 9 13 11 
Minnesota 20 12 1290 19 10 20 24 
Penn 32 13 1205 5 11 22 8 
Boston Uni 40 14 1200 20 12 14 19 
Cal Tech 19 15 968 26 13 3 25 
Brown 33 16 950 21 12 17 11 
Northwestern 37 17 945 4 15 8 9 
Michigan 45 18 896 13 16 18 11 
Duke 50 19 858 22 12 21 20 
UCLA 38 20 850 14 15 24 16 
Wisconsin  33 21 717 18 10 15 21 
Ohio State 29 22 688 29 7 28 28 
Michigan State 43 23 672 23 17 23 30 
Illinois 26 24 666 27 11 26 23 
Southern Cal 23 25 649 28 19 6 29 
Cornell 29 26 525 15 20 19  15 
UT-Austin 28 27 474 16 12 29 17 
Rochester 24 28 306 17 1 27 27 
Carnegie-Mellon 24 29 284 24 23 16 22 
Pittsburgh 24 30 267 30 12 30 26 
        
 
*N is the number of faculty members included; rd50 is the department’s rank as measured by the median unadjusted 
citations, and C550 is that median; KMS (2003) is the ranking in the U.S. based on the impact factors of five years of 
publications in economics journals of all faculty at the institution; x* is the number of ranks above rd50 in which the 
department’s top quartile of faculty members, as ranked by citations, would be above the rd50 - x* department’s median 
faculty member; rd90 is the department’s rank as measured by the of the faculty member at the 90th percentile of this 
measure in the department; r*d50 is the department’s rank as measured by the median experience-adjusted citations. 
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Figure 7. Position of Citations to Articles in the Economic Journal and Review of Economics 
  and Statistics in the Distribution of Citations to J5 Articles 
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Table 9. The Impact of Citations on Economists' Salariesa   
      
Study Group and  Citation Covariates 
% impact of 
10% increase Novelty 
  year(s)  measure  in citations
b
 
      
Hamermesh et al. 
(1982) Fulls, 7 large Average SSCI Experience, 1.4  
  public schools last 5 years  admin, theorist   
 1979   school FE   
   (# articles, books)   
      
Diamond (1986) All ranks,  SSCI per year 
Experience, 
cohort 2.6% for each Long longit. 
 1961-79,    extra 10  cites  
  UC-Berkeley     
      
Sauer (1988) 
Assocs & fulls, 7 
large departments 
SSCI last 7 
years Experience, 1.2 , 
   
 admin, top 
journal,  
 Co-
authorship, 
pages, journal 
     pages, other papers,  quality 
   books, school FE   
      
Hamermesh 
(1989)c Fulls, 6 large  Average SSCI 
Experience, 
admin, 0.5 Person FE 
   public schools last 5 years person FE   
  1979, 1985      
      
Siow (1991) Hamermesh Average SSCI 
Experience, 
admin, ↓ as  Timing of 
  (1989) data last 5 years person FE  experience citations in 
     ↑  career 
      
      
Kenny and  All faculty, 10 SSCI lifetime 
Experience, 
admin, gender. 1.2 Impact-factor 
 Studley (1995)  large depart-   quality-adjusted  adjustment of 
  ments, 1987   articles   citations 
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Moore  Tenured faculty, SSCI lifetime 
Experience, 
gender, seniority, 0.4 Productivity 
 et al. (1998)  9 state schools,   quality/quantity,   and wage- 
 1992   foreign, Ph.D.   seniority 
    quality, teaching   relation 
   
 Award 
   
Baser and Pema All faculty, SSCI Lifetime Gender, article 0.8 Separate self, others’ 
 (2003) 9 midwestern  quality/quantity,   citations 
  state schools,   admin, school FE   
  1992-1999      
      
Bratsberg All faculty, SSCI Lifetime 
Experience,  
gender, seniority, 0.1 Wage-  seniority and 
 et al. (2010) 5 midwestern  quality/quantity,   turnover 
  state schools,   pages, books   
  1974-2004      
      
Hamermesh and Fulls, 43 large SSCI Lifetime 
Experience, 
gender, foreign, 0.9 Distribution of citations 
 Pfann (2012)  ublic schools   
field, no. of pubs, 
“home runs,”    
 2008   runs”, surname,    
    name, school FE    
      
Hilmer  All faculty, 53 SSCI Lifetime 
Experience,   
gender, seniority, 0.8 Large sample, 
 et al. (2015)  large public   quality/quantity,   detail on co- 
  schools,    pages   authorship 
 
Gibson                       Tenured, UC            WoS Lifetime     Experience,              0.1             Journal impact                              
 et al. (2015)                 system                                                gender, seniority,                       factors 
                                                                                                chaired, others 
 
Based on Sen             16 Ontario                WoS Lifetime    Experience, gender. 0.9            Canada  
    et al. (2010)             schools, a≥12            by Article           pooled 2006-2011 
                                                                                                  school FE 
 
alog(9-month or 9-month equivalent salary) is the dependent variable.  
      
bUnless otherwise noted.     
      
cUses log(9-month real compensation) as 
the dependent variable.     
 
